ai-multimodal
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/media_optimizer.pyutilizes theeval()function to process ther_frame_ratemetadata field extracted from media files viaffprobe. Because metadata in media files can be arbitrarily modified by an attacker, passing this data directly toeval()creates a risk of arbitrary code execution. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/media_optimizer.pyscript usessubprocess.run()to executeffmpegandffprobecommands. While necessary for the skill's media optimization functionality, this allows for the execution of external system binaries based on user-supplied file paths. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: This skill is designed to ingest and process external, untrusted media files including PDFs, images, audio, and video. The content extracted from these files (such as OCR text or transcriptions) is fed into the AI agent's context, which could allow for indirect prompt injection attacks if the source files contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Media files are processed in
scripts/gemini_batch_process.pyandscripts/document_converter.py. - Boundary markers: None identified in the script code for delimiting extracted content within the prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,Read,Write, andEdittools. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content extracted from media files before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata