figma
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The
references/figma-mcp-config.mdfile provides instructions to modify shell profile files, specifically~/.bashrcand~/.zshrc, to persist theFIGMA_OAUTH_TOKEN. Modification of shell profiles is a common persistence mechanism used to maintain state across sessions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted design data from external Figma URLs, which serves as an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The agent fetches node metadata and design context using tools described in
SKILL.mdandreferences/figma-tools-and-prompts.md. - Boundary markers: There are no specific instructions or delimiters mentioned to isolate Figma-provided content from the agent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to generate and implement code (React/Tailwind) within the local repository based on the data retrieved.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or verification steps are outlined for the data retrieved from Figma node names, descriptions, or variables.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The instructions in
SKILL.mddirect the agent to directly accesslocalhostsources if provided by the remote Figma MCP server for assets. This behavior can be exploited for local network probing or Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) if the remote server returns malicious local loopback addresses. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill initiates connections to the official Figma MCP server at
https://mcp.figma.com/mcp. While this is a reference to a well-known service, it involves fetching and processing data from a remote endpoint at runtime.
Audit Metadata