grounded-research-benchmark
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill includes functionality to self-evolve by generating new skill files at runtime. In Phase 5, it explicitly calls the tool
kilo_synthesize_skillto automatically generate newSKILL.mdfiles when a reusable architectural solution is identified. This represents dynamic script generation that alters the agent's future capabilities. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources during its research phases, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect instructions.
- Ingestion points: External grounding data is fetched from GitHub repositories and
llms.txtfiles (Phase 2 and 3). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety markers to differentiate between the agent's instructions and data retrieved from external research.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write to internal memory (
kilo_remember_fact), persist reflections (kilo_record_reflection), and generate new skill files (kilo_synthesize_skill). - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization or validation logic for the content retrieved from external GitHub repositories before it is synthesized into architectural decisions or new skills.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes browser automation for verification. Phase 4 mentions the use of Playwright for End-to-End (E2E) testing to verify implementation results.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs research by fetching data from external services. In Phase 2, the
invoke_subagenttool is instructed to retrieve patterns and design samples from GitHub repositories (specifically those with 10k+ stars) andllms.txtdocumentation.
Audit Metadata