to-tickets
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data, such as specification files, issue descriptions, and conversation comments, which serves as a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The 'Process' section in
SKILL.mdspecifies that the agent should fetch and read the full body and comments of references provided by the user (specs, issue numbers, or URLs). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious commands embedded within the fetched context.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to read local codebase files, write new files to the
.scratch/directory, and interact with external issue tracking platforms. - Sanitization: There is no explicit requirement for the agent to sanitize or validate the external data before processing it into ticket titles and descriptions.
Audit Metadata