ui-styling
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains instructions labeled as 'CRITICAL RULE' using authoritative language ('MUST') to mandate a specific research workflow. This pattern is designed to override the agent's default decision-making process. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill mandates that the agent scrape external UI galleries (such as Awwwards and ThreeUI) to extract design tokens. This creates a significant ingestion surface for untrusted data that could influence subsequent agent actions.
- Ingestion points: Web scraping of external galleries via a multimodal subagent (specified in
SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None present to distinguish between instructions and ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file writing capabilities and command execution via
subprocess.run(found inscripts/shadcn_add.py). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the scraped visual or textual content is implemented.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/shadcn_add.pyusessubprocess.runto execute thenpxCLI for component installation. While it avoids using a shell, it executes processes based on arguments derived from agent or user input. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions and scripts facilitate the download and execution of external components from the NPM registry using the
npx shadcn@latestcommand.
Audit Metadata