fiftyone-model-evaluation
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill's
README.mddocumentation recommends an installation method that usescurl -sL skil.sh | shto download and execute a script from an external domain. This pattern is inherently dangerous as it executes unverified remote code with the user's local privileges. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains directives to download and enable external plugins from thevoxel51/fiftyone-pluginsGitHub repository using functions likedownload_plugin. This allows the skill to dynamically extend its functionality by fetching and running code from a remote source. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute various system and application-level commands, including operator execution via
execute_operatorand managing application sessions withlaunch_appandclose_app. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted data from dataset fields (e.g., model predictions and ground truth annotations) which could be used to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested from dataset fields in
SKILL.mdvia theexecute_operator(specifically parameters likepred_fieldandgt_field) and through Python SDK calls likefo.load_dataset(). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define boundary markers or provide directives to the agent to ignore any potential instructions embedded within the dataset samples.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to sensitive capabilities including plugin management (
download_plugin,enable_plugin), operator execution, and application control. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or schema validation performed on the contents of the label fields before they are processed by the evaluation logic.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata