fiftyone-voodo-design
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The README.md file contains installation instructions that use a
curl | shpattern:curl -sL skil.sh | sh -s -- voxel51/fiftyone-skills. This method is inherently insecure as it executes a remote script directly in the shell without prior inspection, allowing for arbitrary code execution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill initiates network requests to external domains to function and install:
- It downloads a shell script from
skil.shduring the installation process. - It uses the
WebFetchtool to retrieve a Markdown reference file fromvoodo.dev.fiftyone.aiduring runtime to inform code generation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions that lead to the execution of shell commands through the installation script, which can potentially perform system-level changes.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill relies on fetching an external documentation file (
voodo-llm-reference.md) to guide the AI's generation of React code. This creates a surface where the agent's behavior could be influenced by malicious instructions embedded in the external content. - Ingestion points:
WebFetchcall inSKILL.mdforhttps://voodo.dev.fiftyone.ai/voodo-llm-reference.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the agent to ignore or delimit embedded instructions within the fetched data.
- Capability inventory: The skill is capable of generating React components, defining application layout patterns, and specifying library dependencies.
- Sanitization: None; the skill does not mention any validation or filtering of the fetched content before processing it.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata