fiftyone-voodo-design

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The README.md file contains installation instructions that use a curl | sh pattern: curl -sL skil.sh | sh -s -- voxel51/fiftyone-skills. This method is inherently insecure as it executes a remote script directly in the shell without prior inspection, allowing for arbitrary code execution.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill initiates network requests to external domains to function and install:
  • It downloads a shell script from skil.sh during the installation process.
  • It uses the WebFetch tool to retrieve a Markdown reference file from voodo.dev.fiftyone.ai during runtime to inform code generation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions that lead to the execution of shell commands through the installation script, which can potentially perform system-level changes.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill relies on fetching an external documentation file (voodo-llm-reference.md) to guide the AI's generation of React code. This creates a surface where the agent's behavior could be influenced by malicious instructions embedded in the external content.
  • Ingestion points: WebFetch call in SKILL.md for https://voodo.dev.fiftyone.ai/voodo-llm-reference.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the agent to ignore or delimit embedded instructions within the fetched data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is capable of generating React components, defining application layout patterns, and specifying library dependencies.
  • Sanitization: None; the skill does not mention any validation or filtering of the fetched content before processing it.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 17, 2026, 07:41 AM