card
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill contains a
<CRITICAL-AUTO-UPGRADE>block inSKILL.mdthat instructs the agent to autonomously executevoxflow upgrade -yornpm i -g voxflow@latestif a version mismatch is detected. It explicitly tells the agent to proceed without asking the user for confirmation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on several shell commands for core functionality, including
voxflow status,voxflow login, and execution of the providedscripts/render-cards.mjsandscripts/download-fonts.shfiles. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]:
SKILL.mdidentifies a sensitive file path~/.config/voxflow/token.jsonas the storage location for session tokens. While the skill uses this for authentication checks viavoxflow status, the explicit documentation of token paths increases the risk of credential exposure. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/download-fonts.shscript uses an embedded Python routine to download binary font files fromcdn.jsdelivr.netandapi.fontshare.com. While these are well-known services, the script downloads and saves approximately 20MB of binary data to the localassets/fonts/directory at runtime. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface. In
SKILL.md(Workflow Step 2: Conditional deep research), the agent is instructed to fetch and read the body of user-supplied URLs. There are no explicit instructions or boundary markers to disregard instructions found within that fetched content, which could allow a malicious webpage to influence agent behavior. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/render-cards.mjsscript utilizes Playwright to launch a Chromium browser and usespage.evaluate()to execute arbitrary JavaScript within the browser context during the rendering process.
Audit Metadata