content

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection by design because it processes data from the brand/ directory as hard instructional requirements.
  • Ingestion points: Reads core identity, voice rules, and visual styles from brand/BRAND.md, brand/VOICE.md, and brand/VISUAL.md. It also processes external writing samples from brand/voice-samples/.
  • Boundary markers: None. The skill explicitly instructs the agent to apply these constraints as 'hard requirements, not suggestions,' which increases the risk that malicious instructions embedded in these files will be obeyed.
  • Capability inventory: The skill coordinates multiple content generation sub-skills and can spawn parallel agents to perform complex, multi-platform workflows.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the content within these brand files is performed before they are interpolated into the agent context.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The routing mechanism passes unvalidated user arguments directly to sub-skills.
  • Ingestion points: User-supplied subcommands and arguments following the /content trigger.
  • Capability inventory: These arguments determine which sub-skill is executed and what context is passed to it, potentially allowing for prompt injection through crafted arguments.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 15, 2026, 03:25 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — content