prd-create
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on several external CLI tools to perform its functions. It detects and executes
gitfor version control operations,ghfor GitHub interaction,glabfor GitLab,teafor Forgejo, anduzifor automation tasks. Specifically, it uses these tools to query schedules, manage repository remotes, commit changes, and push directly to the primary branch. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes external and user-provided data.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through user-provided feature descriptions in Step 1 and external tool outputs like
uzi schedule list --jsonanduzi repo list --json. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested feature descriptions or tool outputs.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including writing files to the local
prds/directory, committing and pushing to the remotemainbranch, modifying forge issues/labels, and spawning subagent reviewers. - Sanitization: The skill does not specify sanitization, escaping, or validation mechanisms for the user-supplied text before it is incorporated into generated PRDs or passed to downstream tools.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill leverages the agent platform's capabilities to dynamically spawn subagents for the purpose of PRD review. The agent is instructed to determine the number and focus of these reviewers based on the complexity and size of the generated PRD content.
Audit Metadata