prd-done
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of system CLI tools to manage the development workflow.
- Evidence: It uses
git,gh(GitHub),glab(GitLab), andtea(Forgejo/Gitea) to perform operations like branch creation, commits, pushing code, and merging PRs. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to search for, parse, and execute arbitrary bash commands found in external project files.
- Evidence: Section 3.1 and 3.5 in
SKILL.mdinstruct the agent to identify bash commands inPULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.mdand execute them (e.g., 'Any bash commands shown in code blocks -> Consider if they should be executed'). Although it includes a user confirmation step, the agent is acting as an execution vector for untrusted data. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's behavior is heavily influenced by the content of files within the target repository, which could be modified by third parties in a collaborative environment.
- Ingestion points: Reads
PULL_REQUEST_TEMPLATE.md(Section 3.1),.github/release.yml(Section 3.6), and git logs/diffs (Section 3.2). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define clear delimiters or sanitization rules for the content read from these templates.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands, perform network operations via git/forge CLIs, and modify the local filesystem (moving PRD files).
- Sanitization: There is no mention of escaping or validating the content of the templates before parsing them for actionable instructions.
Audit Metadata