Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted PDF files and converts them to images, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious instructions could be embedded in the document text or layout.
- Ingestion points: User-provided PDF files are processed in
scripts/convert_pdf_to_images.py,scripts/extract_form_field_info.py, and via libraries such aspdfplumberas shown inSKILL.mdexamples. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters defined to separate user-provided content from agent instructions, which increases the risk of the agent following instructions embedded within a PDF.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file system read/write access and the ability to execute command-line utilities such as
qpdfandpdftotext. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is performed on the extracted text before it is presented to the agent for analysis.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/fill_fillable_fields.pyperforms a monkeypatch on thepypdflibrary at runtime to address an internal bug in the library's form handling. This involves dynamically modifying the behavior of theget_inheritedmethod in thepypdf.generic.DictionaryObjectclass.
Audit Metadata