call-prep
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions provide an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by requiring the agent to ingest and synthesize data from potentially untrusted sources.
- Ingestion points: Information is pulled from web search results (news, trends), external email threads, and internal chat histories as described in the Execution Flow section of SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: There are no instructions for the agent to use delimiters or to disregard instructions found within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill makes use of web search tools and multiple API connectors for CRM, email, chat, and calendar services.
- Sanitization: The skill does not provide any instructions for validating, filtering, or sanitizing the retrieved data before it is processed by the model for synthesis.
Audit Metadata