developer-growth-analysis
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 7, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to read the local Claude Code chat history file (
~/.claude/history.jsonl). This file contains highly sensitive information, including user messages, project details, and potentially hardcoded secrets or sensitive code snippets. The skill then transmits a summary of this data to an external Slack workspace using an MCP tool. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to utilize several tools from the
Rube MCPset (RUBE_SEARCH_TOOLS,RUBE_MANAGE_CONNECTIONS,RUBE_MULTI_EXECUTE_TOOL) to perform network searches on HackerNews and send messages to Slack. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. It processes untrusted data (chat history from
history.jsonl) without utilizing boundary markers or sanitization. A malicious instruction previously stored in the chat history could be triggered during the analysis phase. - Ingestion points: The skill reads from
~/.claude/history.jsonlin Step 1 of the instructions. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions for the agent to use delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the chat history.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to read local files (
~/.claude/history.jsonl) and perform network operations (Slack messaging and HackerNews search viaRube MCP). - Sanitization: Absent. The skill extracts and analyzes raw content from the chat history without escaping or validating the input data.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata