pitch-deck
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from multiple external sources which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The workflow involves reading and extracting data from user-provided Excel, CSV, PDF reports, Word documents, databases, and PowerPoint templates (SKILL.md, Phase 1 & 2).
- Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or "ignore instructions" delimiters are specified for handling the extracted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses shell commands for file conversion (
soffice,pdftoppm) and writes files to the local system (SKILL.md, Phase 4). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the content extracted from external sources before it is interpolated into the deck or processed by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands for visual validation loops.
- Evidence: The validation phase (SKILL.md, Phase 4) explicitly instructs the execution of
soffice --headless --convert-to pdf presentation.pptxandpdftoppm -jpeg -r 150 presentation.pdf slide. These commands process files that are either provided by the user or generated from user data.
Audit Metadata