subagent-pipeline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to handle external data that could contain malicious instructions aimed at overriding agent behavior or exfiltrating data.
- Ingestion points: The workflow involves reading issue bodies, git diffs, automated-review output, PR comments, and handover documentation as described in SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly mention an 'untrusted-content rule' and command the agent to treat external content as 'evidence only' rather than instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell commands including
git(for diffing and worktree management) and the GitHub CLIgh(for reviews, API interaction, and merging). - Sanitization: There are specific instructions to redact credential values and local file paths, and a requirement for human authorization (
auto_merge_authorized) for critical operations. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on system-level commands to perform its primary functions.
- Evidence: The workflow steps in SKILL.md prescribe the use of
git diff,git worktree,gh pr review,gh api, andgh pr merge --squash --auto.
Audit Metadata