subagent-pipeline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by design, as subagents process external data from GitHub to perform automated code changes.
- Ingestion points: Subagents read the issue body and PR comments fetched via
gh api(specificallygh api repos/.../pulls/.../comments). - Boundary markers: The instructions mandate "self-contained prompts" for subagents, including "explicit out-of-scope boundaries" to prevent unintended context inheritance.
- Capability inventory: The workflow utilizes
gitfor code modification (commit, push) andghfor administrative PR actions (review, merge). - Sanitization: The skill explicitly requires a bail-out contract and a mandatory redaction policy for credentials and local file paths in all outputs.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses standard CLI tools (
git,gh) to manage the software development lifecycle. These are executed to perform repository operations, worktree management, and GitHub API interactions. It also references project-specific tooling such asai-agent-pr-metadatafor metadata management and disposition gates.
Audit Metadata