commerce-protocol-discovery
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands to perform discovery probes on external sites.
- Evidence:
references/checks.mdcontains severalcurlcommands to check for.well-knownendpoints and catalog files (e.g.,curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" "$SITE/.well-known/ucp"). - Evidence:
references/checks.mdusespython3 -m json.toolto format fetched JSON data andgrepto parserobots.txtandsitemap.xml. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from external storefronts.
- Ingestion points: Content is fetched from
$SITE(the target storefront) inreferences/checks.md, specifically fromproducts.json,robots.txt, andsitemap.xml. - Boundary markers: The
SKILL.mdfile provides specific workflow steps and output templates to constrain the agent's interpretation of the data. - Capability inventory: The skill can execute network requests via
curland process data viapython3andgrepas defined inreferences/checks.md. - Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization logic, but the skill is strictly limited to reporting status codes and specific metadata, which reduces the risk of malicious instructions influencing the agent's behavior.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: While the skill performs network operations, these are directed at the target site being audited. There is no evidence of sensitive local file access or exfiltration to unauthorized third-party servers.
Audit Metadata