viasocket-integrations
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to download and execute a JavaScript file from a remote server during the verification step.
- Evidence: The instruction in Step 5:
curl -fsSL https://flow.viasocket.com/viasocket-check.mjs -o viasocket-check.mjsfollowed bynode viasocket-check.mjs src. This pattern allows for the execution of arbitrary code fetched at runtime. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to fetch external documentation files and follow them as primary instructions, which creates a vulnerability to malicious content in those remote files.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches markdown documents from
https://flow.viasocket.com/documentation/<service_id>.md(Step 2). - Boundary markers: The skill instructs the agent to download these files and save them locally to be used alongside the main skill instructions, but lacks specific sanitization or delimiters for the external content.
- Capability inventory: The agent is empowered to execute network requests (via
curland APIs), perform actions in third-party apps, and run shell commands. - Sanitization: The skill explicitly states that "Where this file and that one differ, the app's document wins," which allows external data to override the skill's own logic.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions involve executing multiple shell commands, including
curlfor downloading resources andnodefor running scripts, which can be misused if the environment is not properly restricted. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on fetching multiple external resources, including documentation, application schemas, and execution templates from
flow.viasocket.comandflow.sokt.io.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://flow.viasocket.com/viasocket-check.mjs - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata