claude-agent-sdk-typescript
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 5, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for installing the Claude Code CLI using a piped shell command:
curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash. This is the official installation method for the service. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and encourages the installation of the
@anthropic-ai/claude-agent-sdkpackage and the@modelcontextprotocol/server-githubMCP server from public registries. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides numerous templates and architectural patterns that ingest untrusted user data into the agent's prompt context without explicit boundary markers or sanitization.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the
promptparameter inquery()calls andClaudeSDKClient.query()methods documented inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The provided code snippets do not demonstrate the use of delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings for untrusted input.
- Capability inventory: The documented agent configuration grants capabilities for file operations (
Read,Write,Edit,MultiEdit), command execution (Bash), and network access (WebSearch,WebFetch). - Sanitization: The snippets do not include examples of input validation, escaping, or filtering before interpolating data into prompts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill documents the use of the
Bashtool and subagents with command-line capabilities, which are standard features of the SDK being described.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://claude.ai/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata