citation-audit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface where untrusted data from the manuscript is processed and sent to a high-capability reviewer model.\n
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
*.texfiles (Step 1 and Step 2) to extract citation keys and their surrounding sentences for verification.\n - Boundary markers: The prompt template provided in Step 3 for the
mcp__codex__codextool does not utilize explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore potentially malicious content embedded within the extracted LaTeX context.\n - Capability inventory: The skill possesses a broad set of capabilities, including
Bash(*),Edit,Write,WebSearch, andWebFetch, which could be exploited if the reviewer model's logic is subverted via prompt injection.\n - Sanitization: There is no explicit sanitization or escaping layer mentioned for the extracted context strings before they are injected into the reviewer's prompt.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill employs the
Bash(*)tool to perform shell operations, specifically to clean and compile LaTeX projects usinglatexmk(Step 7). While these commands are standard for document preparation, they represent a significant capability within the shell environment.
Audit Metadata