meta-apply

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 10, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data in the form of patch files (.diff) and manifest data (manifest.jsonl) produced by other agents. This creates a vulnerability where malicious code or instructions hidden within a patch could attempt to bypass the 'jury' reviewer or exploit the agent performing the application.
  • Ingestion points: Staged files in the .aris/meta/pending/ directory.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or 'ignore' instructions are documented for the ingestion of the raw diff content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including Bash, Write, Edit, and the ability to spawn_agent for external reviews.
  • Sanitization: The skill relies on a 'fresh landing review' (a separate LLM instance) and manual human authorization as its primary defense against malicious content.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands via the Bash tool to resolve file paths, read manifest files, and execute a local Python script (provenance.py). Command arguments are constructed using variables (e.g., $TARGET, $AUTHOR, $JURY_REVIEW_ID) sourced from the manifest files staged by other agents, which could lead to command injection if those files are maliciously crafted.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically spawns a new reviewer agent (spawn_agent) at runtime to judge the staged patches. While this is used as a security measure, it involves invoking a high-capability model based on parameters derived from the current task context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 10, 2026, 09:37 AM