paper-talk
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Bashtool to execute various local utilities for document processing, includingxelatex,pdflatex, andlatexmkfor LaTeX compilation;pdfinfoandpdftoppmfor PDF manipulation; andsoffice(LibreOffice) for converting PPTX to PDF. These operations are intended for the skill's primary function but involve executing commands on files derived from user-provided input. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from an external paper directory.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context from
PAPER_DIR/main.tex,PAPER_DIR/sections/*.tex, andPAPER_DIR/main.pdf. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define explicit security delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when extracting text from the paper artifacts to generate slide outlines, speaker notes, or talk scripts.
- Capability inventory: The agent has significant capabilities including file system access (
Read,Write,Edit,Glob), subprocess execution (Bash), and the ability tospawn_agent, which could be abused if an attacker-controlled paper successfully injects instructions. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the extracted paper content before it is interpolated into prompts for generating the presentation materials.
Audit Metadata