patent-pipeline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes external, untrusted invention descriptions.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via
$ARGUMENTSand several project files includingINVENTION_BRIEF.md,IDEA_REPORT.md,refine-logs/FINAL_PROPOSAL.md, andNARRATIVE_REPORT.md. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define strict boundary markers or include specific instructions for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes powerful tools including
Bash(*),WebSearch,WebFetch,Write, andEdit, which could be exploited if malicious instructions are successfully injected via the invention description. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the input data is mentioned in the workflow.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands and relies on local scripts for its execution logic.
- Evidence: The skill instructions explicitly utilize
Bash(*)(e.g., for handling large file writes via heredocs) and direct the agent to resolve reviewer invocations using a specific script namedreviewer_route.py. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs network-based searches and data retrieval.
- Evidence: The workflow includes a 'Prior Art Search' phase that uses
WebSearchandWebFetchto interact with external patent databases (Google Patents, Espacenet) and academic literature.
Audit Metadata