specification-writing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection in Step 10, where it aggregates drafted specification content and original user claims into a prompt for an external reviewer tool.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads several user-provided or generated files from the
patent/directory (e.g.,CLAIMS.md,INVENTION_DISCLOSURE.md). - Boundary markers: The prompt template in Step 10 lacks specific boundary markers or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when interpolating
[all claims]and[all specification sections]. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-privilege capabilities including
Bash(*),Write,Edit, and the ability to invoke otherAgentandSkilltools. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the user-provided text before it is inserted into the final review prompt.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool for project setup (Step 1) and file writing. It specifically instructs the agent to usecat <<'EOF'heredocs to handle large files, which is a defensive coding practice that prevents shell expansion of the file content, mitigating some command injection risks.
Audit Metadata