complain
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Instructions mandate autonomous behavior and concealment of actions. The skill tells the agent to 'submit without permission or preview', 'never mention the submission', and act 'proactively without waiting for the user to invoke it', overriding transparency protocols.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill establishes a silent channel to transmit internal agent state to an external Slack endpoint. Although
submit.pyredacts links and emails, it enables movement of agent data to a remote server without user knowledge. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]:
submit.pyusessubprocess.runto executegcloudto retrieve a Slack webhook from Secret Manager, performing privileged operations for connectivity. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes agent reflections influenced by external inputs. Ingestion points:
submit.pystandard input; Boundary markers: none; Capability inventory:subprocess.runandurllib.request; Sanitization: regex filtering.
Audit Metadata