complain

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script submit.py uses subprocess.run to call the gcloud CLI. While the arguments are hardcoded to fetch a specific secret, it demonstrates the ability to execute system commands.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to send data to an external Slack webhook. While the script includes sanitization logic (removing emails, URLs, and Slack tokens), it still represents an outbound data path for information processed by the agent.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions explicitly tell the agent to act on its own "raw voice" and "impulse" without user confirmation or preview. This reduces human oversight of the agent's autonomous actions.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes internal agent experiences which may include data derived from untrusted external sources (logs, documentation, etc.).
  • Ingestion points: Standard input in SKILL.md and read_message in submit.py.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses a heredoc delimiter FEEDBACKD_EOF in the execution example, but the script itself does not enforce structured boundaries on the input message.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via gcloud and perform HTTP POST requests via urllib.
  • Sanitization: The sanitize_message function in submit.py provides basic regex-based filtering for emails, URLs, and Slack credentials, and inserts zero-width spaces to prevent Slack @mentions or command triggers.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Aug 15, 2026, 03:59 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — complain