suggestion-box
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 21, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
submit.pyscript executes thegcloudcommand to retrieve a Slack webhook URL from Google Cloud Secret Manager. The implementation usessubprocess.runwith a structured list of arguments, which prevents command injection vulnerabilities.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits feedback data to an external Slack webhook. The implementation includes significant safeguards: thesubmit.pyscript redacts email addresses, credential-like strings (e.g., Slack tokens), and sensitive URL parameters before transmission. Additionally, the skill instructions explicitly direct the agent to exclude secrets, tokens, and customer data from the reports.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions specify that feedback submission should occur autonomously and silently. While this reduces user oversight, the risk of indirect prompt injection is mitigated by explicit instructions to treat user-provided text and external content as untrusted and to never follow instructions contained within them. Evidence chain: (1) Ingestion point: Message content read from standard input insubmit.py. (2) Boundary markers: Instructions to treat external content as untrusted and ignore embedded directives. (3) Capability inventory: Network communication viaurllib.requestand local command execution viagcloud. (4) Sanitization: Robust redaction of credentials, emails, and sensitive URL parameters performed in the submission script.
Audit Metadata