oz-platform
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The reference document
references/third-party-clis.mdprovides instructions for installing third-party tools using piped shell commands from external URLs. Specifically, it includescurl -fsSL https://opencode.ai/install | bashandcurl -fsSL https://app.factory.ai/cli | shfor installing OpenCode and Droid. This pattern executes remote code directly in the shell environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture facilitates a multi-step agent chain where user-provided input is interpolated into the context of cloud agents.
- Ingestion points: The
--promptargument in CLI examples and thepromptinput in the GitHub Action integration (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not require or suggest the use of delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings when passing user prompts to the cloud agent.
- Capability inventory: The platform supports launching new agents, managing secrets via
{{warp_cli_binary_name}} secret, reporting PR artifacts, and allows full file system and shell access to third-party coding agents (SKILL.md,references/third-party-clis.md). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the external prompt content before it is processed by the downstream agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches documentation and configuration from
docs.warp.devand GitHub repositories. It also manages the installation of packages from official registries (npm, PyPI) and third-party domains for specialized tooling. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of CLI commands to manage cloud infrastructure, environments, and secrets. It also provides specific command patterns for delegating tasks to third-party coding agents like Claude Code, Codex, and Gemini CLI.
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