huggingface-datasets
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill contains explicit instructions to access sensitive local directories containing agent session traces (
~/.claude/projects,~/.codex/sessions,~/.pi/agent/sessions) and upload them to a remote service. This represents a significant risk of moving private interaction history to a third-party cloud environment. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The instructions acknowledge that these session traces can contain "secrets, or PII," yet still encourages the transfer of this data to Hugging Face repositories.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands to manage data, including
npx,hf upload, andhf repos create, which are used to move local files to remote servers. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill invokes
npx -y @huggingface/hub, which downloads and executes external code from the NPM registry at runtime. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from the Hugging Face Dataset Viewer API.
- Ingestion points: Hugging Face Dataset Viewer API endpoints (
/rows,/search,/filter,/parquet) inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions for the agent to delimit or ignore instructions that may be embedded within the external dataset content.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via
npxandhf-cli, sensitive local file system access (~/.claude/projects, etc.), and network operations viacurland the Hugging Face API. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not suggest any validation, filtering, or escaping of the content retrieved from the external API before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata