huggingface-datasets

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 3, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill contains explicit instructions to access sensitive local directories containing agent session traces (~/.claude/projects, ~/.codex/sessions, ~/.pi/agent/sessions) and upload them to a remote service. This represents a significant risk of moving private interaction history to a third-party cloud environment.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The instructions acknowledge that these session traces can contain "secrets, or PII," yet still encourages the transfer of this data to Hugging Face repositories.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands to manage data, including npx, hf upload, and hf repos create, which are used to move local files to remote servers.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill invokes npx -y @huggingface/hub, which downloads and executes external code from the NPM registry at runtime.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from the Hugging Face Dataset Viewer API.
  • Ingestion points: Hugging Face Dataset Viewer API endpoints (/rows, /search, /filter, /parquet) in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions for the agent to delimit or ignore instructions that may be embedded within the external dataset content.
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via npx and hf-cli, sensitive local file system access (~/.claude/projects, etc.), and network operations via curl and the Hugging Face API.
  • Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not suggest any validation, filtering, or escaping of the content retrieved from the external API before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 3, 2026, 12:41 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — huggingface-datasets