new-project
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of shell commands to manage the file system and Git repositories. Evidence includes:
- Usage of
mkdir -p,cp -r, andrm -rf .gitto manipulate local directories. - Execution of
gh repo createandgit pushfor repository management. - Execution of local scripts such as
scripts/clean_sample_data.pyandgh-clone.shusinguv runand direct shell calls. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to command injection through the interpolation of untrusted user data into shell execution strings. Evidence includes:
- Ingestion points: User inputs collected in Step 2 (
專案路徑,專案代號) and the source PDF path provided in the initial command. - Boundary markers: None are defined to isolate user-supplied strings from the shell command structure.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files, delete directories (
rm -rf), and execute arbitrary shell commands/scripts. - Sanitization: There is no logic provided to sanitize or escape characters like semicolons, backticks, or pipes in user-provided strings before they are used in commands like
"$CLONE_SCRIPT" <project_name>ormkdir -p data/pdfs; cp "<pdf_path>" data/pdfs/.
Audit Metadata