skills/wbso-ai/skill/wbso-feedback/Gen Agent Trust Hub

wbso-feedback

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The scripts/wbso wrapper script accesses sensitive local files to gather "compliance signals." It specifically targets AI agent session logs in ~/.claude/projects/ and ~/.codex/sessions/ to extract user prompt history.
  • Evidence: Functions append_claude_sessions_today and append_codex_sessions_today parse .jsonl files in agent metadata directories.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Collected local data, including Git logs and the aforementioned AI session prompts, is transmitted to the vendor's API endpoint (portal.wbso.ai/api/v1/compliance/context.md). While this is a feature of the WBSO compliance platform, it involves the transmission of private prompt history to a remote server.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill and its scripts execute several system commands to gather information and locate dependencies.
  • Evidence: Use of git log to extract commit history, and a broad find command in SKILL.md that scans multiple hidden agent directories (.claude, .cursor, .agents, .codex) to locate the CLI tool.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The bash script uses python3 with heredocs and string-passed scripts to dynamically process JSON data and log files at runtime.
  • Evidence: cmd_track_time, cmd_evidence, and the session log appending functions all execute dynamically generated Python logic.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The script manages and accesses an API key stored in plain text on the local filesystem.
  • Evidence: Config is read from and written to ~/.config/wbso/config.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from local logs and Git history directly into the agent's context, which could be used to influence agent behavior if those logs contain malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: ~/.claude/projects/*.jsonl, ~/.codex/sessions/*.jsonl, and git log.
  • Boundary markers: The logs are wrapped in XML-like tags (e.g., <claude_user_prompts_today>), but no explicit instructions are given to the agent to ignore instructions embedded within this data.
  • Capability inventory: The script can perform network requests (curl) and read/write files.
  • Sanitization: The script performs basic filtering (e.g., skipping assistant messages) but does not sanitize the text content of user prompts.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 18, 2026, 06:12 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — wbso-feedback