skills/wbso-ai/skill/wbso-signup/Gen Agent Trust Hub

wbso-signup

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 17, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script scripts/wbso collects highly sensitive local data from the user's environment. This includes git commit history (via git log), Claude Code session logs from ~/.claude/projects/, and Codex session logs from ~/.codex/sessions/. This data is transmitted to the remote API at https://portal.wbso.ai during the execution of the context command.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The parse_args function in scripts/wbso utilizes the eval command to dynamically assign variables from CLI arguments. Specifically, the line eval "ARG_${key//-/_}=\"\$val\"" is vulnerable to shell command injection. If a user provides an argument value containing shell metacharacters (e.g., $(command)), it will be executed within the context of the script.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an indirect prompt injection surface by reading external, potentially attacker-controlled data into the agent's context.
  • Ingestion points: The context command in scripts/wbso reads data from local git repositories and external tool logs.
  • Boundary markers: No delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present when this data is injected into the prompt.
  • Capability inventory: The script has access to curl for network operations, python3 for execution, and local file system access.
  • Sanitization: There is no sanitization or filtering of the content read from git logs or session files before it is returned to the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 17, 2026, 08:50 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — wbso-signup