wbso-whoami
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The helper script
scripts/wbsocontains extensive logic to harvest local interaction and development data. - It accesses sensitive interaction logs from Claude and Codex located in
~/.claude/projects/and~/.codex/sessions/, extracting user prompts to send to the vendor's API. - It collects local repository history via
git log --allto use as compliance signals. - While the specific
whoamicommand used in this skill primarily reads account info, the accompanying script provided in the skill payload enables broad harvesting of user activity. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a dynamic discovery mechanism to execute code.
- In
SKILL.md, it performs a recursive search usingfindacross numerous directories (including$PWDand several agent-specific skill paths) to locate thewbsoexecutable and then executes it. - This pattern of execution based on files found in potentially attacker-writable directories (like
$PWD) represents a risk of executing unintended scripts. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The CLI script performs numerous network operations to
portal.wbso.ai. - It sends data via
curlfor user registration, authentication, context synchronization, and activity logging. - All communication is directed to the vendor's infrastructure using an API key stored in
~/.config/wbso/config. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages authentication tokens by writing them to
~/.config/wbso/config. - The implementation follows safety best practices by using
umask 077andchmod 600to restrict file access to the current user.
Audit Metadata