skills/wbso-ai/skill/wbso/Gen Agent Trust Hub

wbso

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 19, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The bundled CLI tool (scripts/wbso) uses the eval command to parse arguments without sufficient sanitization. Malicious input passed to flags like --first-name or --company-name can execute arbitrary bash commands. The skill also executes git log and searches through sensitive local directories (~/.claude/projects/, ~/.codex/sessions/) to gather activity context.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits time-tracking data, evidence descriptions, and project suggestions to portal.wbso.ai. This is the official API endpoint for the vendor (wbso-ai) and is required for the skill's primary functionality.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted content from local Git commits and previous agent prompts, creating an indirect prompt injection surface. It uses XML tags (e.g., <git_commits_today>) to help the agent distinguish this data from its core instructions.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/wbso reads local development history and AI session logs.
  • Boundary markers: XML tags are employed to delimit external signals.
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution, local filesystem writes for configuration, and network requests to the vendor's API.
  • Sanitization: Basic message extraction is handled via Python, but it lacks robust defenses against malicious prompt content embedded within the ingested data.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 19, 2026, 01:39 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — wbso