Concern	Default
Framework	FastAPI (async), `uvicorn[standard]`
Packaging	uv + `pyproject.toml` + `uv.lock`, hatchling, `src/` layout
Database	Postgres 16 + `asyncpg`, SQLAlchemy 2.0 async, Alembic
Config	pydantic-settings `BaseSettings`, env-prefixed, `@lru_cache`
Payments	Stripe ≥15, one signed webhook, idempotency table
Auth	dependency guards + bcrypt; token scheme per app (see AUTH.md)
Frontend	Jinja2 + Tailwind (CDN) + Alpine.js, or a decoupled SPA
Background work	cron-as-worker (same image, different command) — no Celery
Observability	Sentry + PostHog, both no-op until keyed
Deploy	Docker → managed platform (Render-style) via Terraform
Lint/test	ruff + pytest + `pytest-asyncio`, Makefile entrypoint

If you have no reason to deviate, use every row. The rest of this skill is the "how", and the reference files hold copy-pasteable templates.

Package Layout

One layered package, routers split by domain. Business logic never lives in a route.

src/myapp/
  main.py            # app + middleware + include_router() in a loop
  config.py          # pydantic-settings Settings + get_settings()
  db.py              # lazy async engine/sessionmaker + get_session() dep
  models.py          # SQLAlchemy 2.0 DeclarativeBase, Mapped[]
  schemas.py         # Pydantic request/response models
  security.py        # hashing, tokens, auth dependencies
  observability.py   # Sentry/PostHog init (guarded)
  api/               # one APIRouter module per domain (+ deps.py, webhooks.py)
  services/          # business logic; external SDKs isolated here
migrations/versions/ # Alembic
tests/               # pytest, mirrors api/ + services/
terraform/           # render.tf, stripe.tf, posthog.tf, variables.tf
Dockerfile  docker-compose.yml  pyproject.toml  uv.lock  alembic.ini  Makefile

Routes → Services → Models. Routes parse/validate and call services. Services hold the logic and own all external SDK calls (Stripe, email, LLM) so they're mockable. Models are persistence only.

App Wiring

A module-level app (a factory is fine but unnecessary), routers registered in a loop, cross-cutting concerns as middleware, and a health check that proves the DB is reachable. Full template in STACK.md.

# main.py (shape)
app = FastAPI(docs_url=None if settings.is_prod else "/docs")
app.add_middleware(CORSMiddleware, allow_origins=settings.cors_origins, ...)
# request-id + security-headers middleware, slowapi rate limiter
for router in (auth.router, billing.router, webhooks.router, ...):
    app.include_router(router)

@app.get("/health")
async def health(db: SessionDep):
    await db.execute(text("SELECT 1"))   # 503 if the DB is down
    return {"status": "ok"}

Share dependencies as Annotated type aliases — they read cleanly in signatures:

# api/deps.py
SessionDep = Annotated[AsyncSession, Depends(get_session)]
UserDep    = Annotated[User, Depends(require_user)]

Database

Lazy singleton async engine, pool_pre_ping=True, expire_on_commit=False, a get_session() async-generator dependency, and a URL normalizer so platform-issued postgres:// URLs become postgresql+asyncpg://. Postgres in prod, SQLite (aiosqlite) for fast local/CI tests. Migrations via Alembic, applied in the deploy's pre-deploy step. See STACK.md.

Config & Secrets

One Settings(BaseSettings) with an env prefix, @lru_cache get_settings(), and validators that refuse to boot in production with a default/missing secret. Commit a .env.example; never commit .env. Computed @property helpers (is_prod, cors_origins, billing_enabled) keep routes clean.

Payments

Stripe with exactly one signature-verified webhook endpoint, idempotency backed by a persisted events table, and dispatch by event type that never 500s on an unknown event. Isolate every SDK call in a services/stripe/ module. Full patterns (checkout, subscriptions, webhook handler, Terraform-provisioned signing secret) in PAYMENTS.md.

The Decisions You Actually Make

Everything above is fixed. These are the real per-app choices:

Frontend — server-rendered Jinja + Tailwind/Alpine (zero JS build, ship fast) or a decoupled React/Vite SPA on its own origin (richer UI, more moving parts). → FRONTEND.md
Auth scheme — cookie-JWT (browser app), bearer-JWT/API-key (programmatic), magic-link (passwordless), or OAuth (delegated). bcrypt + dependency guards are constant; only the token differs. → AUTH.md
Background work — inline in the request (simplest), cron-as-worker (the default for periodic/queued work), or a Redis-backed job queue (long-poll jobs). Reach for Celery only when you've outgrown all three. → BACKGROUND_JOBS.md
LLM features — pydantic-ai with structured Pydantic outputs, key required at boot, model configurable via env. → FRONTEND.md has the note.

Deployment

Single Docker image (the astral-sh/uv base, two-stage uv sync for layer caching, non-root, uvicorn --proxy-headers). The same image runs web, worker, and migrations via different commands. Target a managed platform; provision it with Terraform (app + Postgres + Stripe + PostHog as code), with a platform Blueprint file as the documented fallback. Migrations run in the pre-deploy step. Secrets are generated in Terraform or marked no-sync and set out of band. → DEPLOYMENT.md

Review Checklist

Structure:
- [ ] Logic in services/, not in route handlers
- [ ] External SDKs (Stripe/email/LLM) isolated behind a service module
- [ ] /health (or /readyz) actually pings the database
- [ ] Job status: failure writes its own terminal value, "in progress" is written
      before the work is handed off, and the current value is read by monotonic id

Data:
- [ ] Async engine is a lazy singleton with pool_pre_ping
- [ ] postgres:// URLs normalized to postgresql+asyncpg://
- [ ] Every schema change has an Alembic migration

Config:
- [ ] Production refuses to boot on a default/missing secret
- [ ] CORS not "*" and HTTPS enforced in production
- [ ] .env.example committed; .env gitignored

Billing & security:
- [ ] Exactly one Stripe webhook, signature-verified, idempotent
- [ ] New passwords centrally limited to 72 UTF-8 bytes before bcrypt hashing
- [ ] Password verification remains unbounded for compatibility with existing hashes
- [ ] Passwords bcrypt-hashed; auth via reusable dependencies
- [ ] CSRF enforced globally for cookie auth (not per-form opt-in); no
      state-changing GET requests — mutations use POST/DELETE
- [ ] Client IP for rate-limit keys/allowlists/audit logs taken from a fixed
      position in the X-Forwarded-For chain (not the spoofable left-most value)
- [ ] Authentication rate limits use a required shared backend; backend outages
      fail closed with 503, while healthy exhausted buckets return 429 + actual TTL
- [ ] Private OpenAPI schema served only by a custom guarded route (`openapi_url=None`)
- [ ] Sentry + PostHog init guarded (no-op when unkeyed, never break a request)

Ship:
- [ ] One Docker image; web/worker/migrate are just different commands
- [ ] Migrations run pre-deploy, not at app startup in prod
- [ ] Infra is in Terraform; secrets are not committed

Reference Files

STACK.md — pyproject, main.py, db.py, config.py, Makefile templates
PAYMENTS.md — Stripe checkout + idempotent webhook patterns
AUTH.md — the four token schemes and shared dependency guards
BACKGROUND_JOBS.md — inline vs cron-worker vs Redis queue
FRONTEND.md — Jinja/Tailwind/Alpine vs decoupled SPA (+ LLM note)
DEPLOYMENT.md — Dockerfile, Terraform, migrations, secrets

building-python-web-apps

Building Python Web Apps

The Default Stack