git-fix-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted external data to plan and execute code fixes.\n
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data is retrieved from Pull Request bodies, review comments, and issue comments using
gh pr viewandgh apicalls inSKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: The instructions lack boundary markers or warnings to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in the external Pull Request content.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent has permissions to execute shell commands, perform
git commitandgit pushoperations, and update Pull Request metadata/comments via the GitHub CLI.\n - Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation or sanitization of retrieved Pull Request data before it is presented to the agent for decision-making.
Audit Metadata