weaviate-cookbooks
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides templates for building RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) and agentic systems that process untrusted data from external Weaviate collections and user prompts.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the
user_promptfield in theRouterAgentand retrieval results from Weaviate collections (e.g.,references/basic_agent.md,references/agentic_rag.md). - Boundary markers: The provided templates generally lack explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within retrieved context, though some signatures like
Generatorinadvanced_rag.mdinclude instructions to use only provided context. - Capability inventory: The generated applications utilize tool-calling capabilities (
RouterAgent.get_response) where the LLM can trigger arbitrary Python functions defined by the user. - Sanitization: The code templates do not implement specific sanitization or escaping for external content before interpolation into prompts.
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The documentation includes setup instructions that involve piping remote scripts to a shell for environment preparation.
- Evidence:
references/pdf_multimodal_rag.mdcontains commands to installuv(curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh) andOllama(curl -fsSL https://ollama.com/install.sh | sh). Both target official domains for well-known developer tools and are documented neutrally as part of the project setup process.
Audit Metadata