internal-comms
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external, potentially untrusted sources like Slack, Email, and Google Drive. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in a Slack message or document could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points:
examples/3p-updates.md,examples/company-newsletter.md, andexamples/faq-answers.mdinstruct the agent to read from Slack, Google Drive, Email, and Calendar. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or specific "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are provided for the data being fetched.
- Capability inventory: The agent is expected to use tools for reading communication platforms (Slack, Gmail/Email) and document stores (Google Drive).
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is specified for the content retrieved from these external sources.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill encourages the agent to access sensitive information stores, including private emails, Slack communications, and internal documents. Accessing these services is necessary for the skill's functionality but introduces a risk of data exposure if the agent's output is misdirected or if the agent is manipulated via indirect injection.
Audit Metadata