ask-yak
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves and follows instructions from untrusted local files, creating a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection.\n
- Ingestion points: The skill reads project-level settings from
.agents/yesyak.json, user-level settings from~/.agents/yesyak.json, and metadata blocks fromAGENTS.md. It also ingests content from pull requests, specs, and plans.\n - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to ignore or sanitize embedded instructions within these data sources. The skill explicitly tells the agent to apply these as "extra instructions" or "replaced sections".\n
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses read-only access to the file system, can execute git commands, and uses
gh/glabto fetch remote data. It also executes a bundled Python script to parse and validate settings.\n - Sanitization: The
check_yesyak.pyscript validates the JSON structure of the settings files but does not perform any sanitization of the natural language instructions contained within them before they are presented to the agent.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing external commands to function, which serves as the entry point for external data.\n - Tool usage: It executes
git,gh(GitHub CLI), andglab(GitLab CLI) to read repository and pull request state. Arguments for these commands, such as branch names, are derived from the local environment, which could pose a parameter injection risk if the environment state is maliciously crafted.\n - Internal scripting: It executes a local Python script
scripts/check_yesyak.pyusingpython3. This script usessubprocess.runto executegit rev-parseto find the project root. The command is constructed as a list, which prevents shell injection.
Audit Metadata