wecomcli-sheet
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to interact with a utility named
wecom-cliusing a command-line interface syntax (e.g.,wecom-cli sheet create --json '...'). While the skill states this is a tool provided by the platform rather than a raw terminal command, the use of string-based command construction poses a risk if arguments are not properly escaped. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
sheet importcommand inSKILL.mdtakes afile_pathparameter. If an agent is coerced by a user to provide a path to sensitive system files (such as~/.ssh/id_rsaor.envfiles), the agent will read these files and upload their contents to the Enterprise WeChat cloud service, effectively exfiltrating them. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface when handling external data.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested from local files during the
importprocess and from remote spreadsheet content viawecom-cli sheet ranges get(as described inreferences/sheet-ranges-get.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack boundary markers or explicit guidance for the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the data retrieved from sheets or imported files.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including reading local files and creating or modifying cloud-based documents.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation to prevent malicious payloads within the spreadsheet data from influencing agent behavior.
Audit Metadata