wecomcli-sheet

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to interact with a utility named wecom-cli using a command-line interface syntax (e.g., wecom-cli sheet create --json '...'). While the skill states this is a tool provided by the platform rather than a raw terminal command, the use of string-based command construction poses a risk if arguments are not properly escaped.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The sheet import command in SKILL.md takes a file_path parameter. If an agent is coerced by a user to provide a path to sensitive system files (such as ~/.ssh/id_rsa or .env files), the agent will read these files and upload their contents to the Enterprise WeChat cloud service, effectively exfiltrating them.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface when handling external data.
  • Ingestion points: Data is ingested from local files during the import process and from remote spreadsheet content via wecom-cli sheet ranges get (as described in references/sheet-ranges-get.md).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack boundary markers or explicit guidance for the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the data retrieved from sheets or imported files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including reading local files and creating or modifying cloud-based documents.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation to prevent malicious payloads within the spreadsheet data from influencing agent behavior.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 18, 2026, 10:33 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — wecomcli-sheet