session-to-meeting-log
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses session logs located at
~/.claude/projects/*/<sessionId>.jsonl. These transcripts contain full conversation histories, tool outputs, and potentially sensitive code or environment information. - The skill includes specific instructions to "Never leak secrets" and "No secrets / tokens / PII" to mitigate risks when creating the summary.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data in the form of previous session transcripts.
- Ingestion points: Reads
.jsonlfiles from the Claude projects directory (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Instructs the agent to filter out
tool_resultblocks and focus on narrative content, but lacks formal delimiters for the raw log content during summarization. - Capability inventory: File read (logs), File write (markdown records), and Bash execution via the fork's toolset.
- Sanitization: Instructions mandate summarization and exclusion of secrets, but the agent remains susceptible to malicious instructions embedded within the processed history logs.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references official documentation from Claude Code to verify platform-specific environment variables and file path conventions.
- Fetches configuration and syntax details from the official
code.claude.comdocumentation site.
Audit Metadata