story-cover
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill incorporates untrusted user input directly into instructions for a third-party image generation model, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious text could influence the model's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Variables such as
{书名}(book title),{作者名}(author name), and{REF_IMAGE}(reference image URL) are sourced from the user and interpolated into the generation prompt. - Boundary markers: The skill does not employ delimiters or explicit instructions for the AI to ignore potential injection patterns within these user-provided strings.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes powerful tools including
curlfor network access,magick/sipsfor image manipulation, and standard shell utilities (jq,base64) for data processing. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation logic is present for the user-supplied strings before they are included in the prompt construction.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs automated downloads from external, user-specified locations.
- Evidence: The script provided in
SKILL.md(Step 4, 图生图) usescurl -fsSLto download image files from a dynamic$REF_IMAGEURL provided by the user into a temporary local directory.
Audit Metadata