story-deslop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user-supplied novel text and has the capability to modify files via the
narrative-writersubagent and local scripts. The prompt template used to invoke the subagent interpolates the user-controlled story content without clear boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands, creating a risk that malicious instructions within a story could influence the agent's actions. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Phase 3 and 4) identifies that the skill reads and processes user-provided novel chapters from the project directory. - Boundary markers: The prompt template for the
narrative-writersubagent inSKILL.mdlacks delimiters (e.g., XML tags or unique markers) to isolate the untrusted story text from the system instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to write and modify files in the project directory using platform tools (
Edit/Write) and executes several local scripts (check-ai-patterns.js,check-degeneration.js,normalize-punctuation.js,author_memory_commit.py) usingnodeandpythonsubprocess calls. - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the user-provided story content is performed before it is passed to the AI models for rewriting, relying entirely on the model's internal safety guardrails.
Audit Metadata