story-deslop

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user-supplied novel text and has the capability to modify files via the narrative-writer subagent and local scripts. The prompt template used to invoke the subagent interpolates the user-controlled story content without clear boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands, creating a risk that malicious instructions within a story could influence the agent's actions.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md (Phase 3 and 4) identifies that the skill reads and processes user-provided novel chapters from the project directory.
  • Boundary markers: The prompt template for the narrative-writer subagent in SKILL.md lacks delimiters (e.g., XML tags or unique markers) to isolate the untrusted story text from the system instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to write and modify files in the project directory using platform tools (Edit/Write) and executes several local scripts (check-ai-patterns.js, check-degeneration.js, normalize-punctuation.js, author_memory_commit.py) using node and python subprocess calls.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the user-provided story content is performed before it is passed to the AI models for rewriting, relying entirely on the model's internal safety guardrails.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 7, 2026, 01:44 PM