orchestrate
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a runner configuration in
runners/codex.mdthat utilizes thecodexCLI with the--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxflag. This flag is designed to explicitly circumvent built-in security sandboxes and user confirmation prompts during code execution.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external sources and incorporates it into implementation prompts, creating a vulnerability surface. - Ingestion points: Data is fetched from GitHub issue titles, bodies, and acceptance criteria using the
ghCLI tool (as described inreferences/dev-loop-protocol.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of strict delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded within the issue content.
- Capability inventory: The orchestrator maintains broad capabilities, including file system modifications (
git worktree), network access (git push,gh api), and command execution. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation performed on the retrieved issue data before it is processed by subagents.- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically constructs prompts and execution environments for subagents, creating a multi-layered execution chain where inputs from one stage (grooming) influence the behavior of the next (takes).
Audit Metadata