polish-skills
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user-provided manuscripts through various automated functions and shell tools. This creates an attack surface where maliciously crafted input text could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during the polishing process.
- Ingestion points: User-supplied text is ingested by functions like
identify_ai_patternsinai-writing-humanizer/SKILL.mdandcheck_text_with_languagetoolingrammar-checker-guide/SKILL.md, and processed via file-based shell commands inacademic-writing-refiner/SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The implementation does not include explicit boundary markers or instructions for the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the processed text.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for network operations via
urllib.requestingrammar-checker-guide/SKILL.mdand shell command execution includingjava -jar,npm install,chktex, andaspellacross multiple files. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization performed on the manuscript text before it is processed or sent to external APIs.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to install external packages to facilitate text linting.
- Evidence: Instructions in
academic-writing-refiner/SKILL.mdcommand the global installation oftextlintand associated rules from the NPM registry. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions and scripts that trigger shell command execution on the host system to perform academic polishing tasks.
- Evidence: The agent is directed to use
java -jarfor LanguageTool CLI,npm installfor linter setup, and technical tools such aschktex,aspell, andgrepfor manuscript analysis inpaper-polish-guide/SKILL.mdandacademic-writing-refiner/SKILL.md.
Audit Metadata