polish-skills

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user-provided manuscripts through various automated functions and shell tools. This creates an attack surface where maliciously crafted input text could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during the polishing process.
  • Ingestion points: User-supplied text is ingested by functions like identify_ai_patterns in ai-writing-humanizer/SKILL.md and check_text_with_languagetool in grammar-checker-guide/SKILL.md, and processed via file-based shell commands in academic-writing-refiner/SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The implementation does not include explicit boundary markers or instructions for the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the processed text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for network operations via urllib.request in grammar-checker-guide/SKILL.md and shell command execution including java -jar, npm install, chktex, and aspell across multiple files.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization performed on the manuscript text before it is processed or sent to external APIs.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to install external packages to facilitate text linting.
  • Evidence: Instructions in academic-writing-refiner/SKILL.md command the global installation of textlint and associated rules from the NPM registry.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions and scripts that trigger shell command execution on the host system to perform academic polishing tasks.
  • Evidence: The agent is directed to use java -jar for LanguageTool CLI, npm install for linter setup, and technical tools such as chktex, aspell, and grep for manuscript analysis in paper-polish-guide/SKILL.md and academic-writing-refiner/SKILL.md.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 15, 2026, 02:49 AM