agent-output-reconciler
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted inputs from external agents, which creates a surface for instructions embedded in logs or results to influence the agent's synthesis. \n- Ingestion points: Task packets, result summaries, repository diffs, and raw-log paths (SKILL.md). \n- Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat external data as non-executable. \n- Capability inventory: The skill invokes tool execution and performs filesystem writes to promoting reports. \n- Sanitization: There is no requirement for sanitizing or filtering the content of ingested raw logs or summaries. \n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on the execution of 'agent-collab policy evaluate' to fetch canonical policy limits and decisions (SKILL.md).
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