gemini-delegate
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses wrapper scripts (
run_gemini.sh,run_gemini.ps1) to invoke the Gemini CLI tool. It explicitly implements the--approval-mode yoloflag, which bypasses all user confirmation for tool calls (such as writing files) initiated by the Gemini model during execution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation instructs users to install external dependencies via NPM (
@anthropic-ai/gemini-clior@anthropic-ai/gemini). While these are associated with a known organization, they are external packages required for the skill's core functionality. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Repository contents and task-specific descriptions are transmitted to Google's Gemini API via the CLI tool. This is intended for delegation but represents the movement of potentially sensitive local data to an external service.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It processes files from the local repository and passes them as context to an external model that has file-writing capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Any repository files specified in the
.ai/gemini_task_<name>.mdcontext file. - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not use specific delimiters or instructions to prevent the model from obeying instructions embedded within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The model has the ability to write and modify files (referenced as the
write_filetool in the documentation). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of repository content is performed before it is interpolated into the prompt for the external model.
Audit Metadata