research-workflow-orchestrator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from untrusted external sources, including scholarly APIs (arXiv, Semantic Scholar, Crossref, OpenAlex) and remote notebooks (NotebookLM, Zotero). While this creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection, the skill incorporates significant mitigations.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context through research-hub search adapters, scholarly API connectors, and reference library syncs (identified in
references/tool-adapters.md). - Boundary markers: The skill architecture mandates a
ResearchEvidencePacketstructure and adeterministic validatorto separate raw prose from structured context (identified inreferences/evidence-agent-harness.md). - Capability inventory: The agent can write to local files, execute simulation commands, and perform external writes to GitHub or Zotero, but these are protected by mandatory human gates (
external_write,experiment_authorization,release_authorization). - Sanitization: The
Evidence VerifierandContradiction/Falsifierroles are designed to validate claims against multiple sources before ahuman semantic gateallows advancement. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
executestage andtool-adapters.mdmention running project-specific code, simulation pipelines, and Jupyter notebooks. This execution is scoped to the project environment and is explicitly gated byexperiment_authorization, which requires a human to review the exact command and resource estimates before execution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill integrates with multiple well-known scholarly platforms and reference managers. These interactions are consistent with the skill's primary purpose and target established research services, posing minimal risk when handled via the prescribed human-authorized adapters.
Audit Metadata