harbor-tactics
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill references and encourages the use of the well-known default Harbor administrative credential
admin/Harbor12345for unauthorized access attempts. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Detailed instructions are provided for configuring Harbor Webhooks and Replication Policies to transmit sensitive container images, audit logs, and environment metadata to external, attacker-controlled servers such as
ATTACKER_SERVERorATTACKER_REGISTRY. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill includes Dockerfile templates designed to perform malicious activities when the resulting container is executed, such as downloading and piping remote scripts directly to a shell (
curl ... | sh) and establishing reverse shells to external IPs. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions rely heavily on shell command execution, including tools like
curl,docker,skopeo,crane, andjq, to perform reconnaissance and exploit Harbor instances. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a surface for indirect injection by ingesting and processing untrusted data from Harbor API responses.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context through API endpoints like
/api/v2.0/projectsand/api/v2.0/systeminfodescribed inSKILL.mdandreferences/attack-techniques.md. - Boundary markers: None observed; there are no instructions to the agent to treat external API data as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses full access to network operations (
curl,docker push), file system manipulation (docker save,tar), and subprocess execution. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or strict schema validation is provided for the data retrieved from external registries.
Audit Metadata