subdomain-deep
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill methodology involves ingesting and processing data from external, untrusted sources such as OSINT APIs and web content during the crawling phase.
- Ingestion points: Data is fetched from OSINT engines like FOFA (SKILL.md, Phase 2) and through website crawling (SKILL.md, Phase 3).
- Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or instructions to treat the ingested external data as untrusted text within the agent's execution context.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell-based reconnaissance tools (
subfinder,amass,ksubdomain,curl,dig) and requires network access (references/enumeration-tools.md). - Sanitization: The documentation does not specify sanitization or validation routines for data retrieved from external sources before it is processed by the agent or included in command pipelines.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The reference documentation in
references/enumeration-tools.mdcontains shell script examples that interpolate variables derived from external discovery into command strings (e.g., usingcurlanddigon discovered subdomains). While standard for security workflows, this pattern represents a potential injection point if the source list of subdomains is maliciously crafted.
Audit Metadata